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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background  
In April 2011 major changes were made to the social welfare system of St Helena 
following a review by an external consultant from the UK, Alan Thompson. At that 
time it was the clear intention of the St Helena Government (SHG) that the new 
system should be reviewed at an appropriate time to assess whether it was meeting 
its aims and to consider what further changes might be necessary. In addition there 
has been an ongoing concern within SHG about how best to uprate benefits.  
 
The objectives of the whole review therefore became twofold: 
x Provide recommendations for the uprating of benefits (initially for the uprating 
due in October 2012).  
x Review the benefits system and make recommendations. 
 
This review was carried out from August 2012 to March 2013 by Roy Sainsbury and 
Jonathan Bradshaw from the Social Policy Research Unit at the University of York, 
UK. Roy Sainsbury visited the island for two weeks in January and February 2013, 
during which time he met with members of the Legislative Council, officers and staff 
of SHG, and representatives of St Helena society (including members of the public, 
employers and civil society groups). 
 
Throughout the review, and particularly in looking to the future, we were asked to 
take into account the possible effects and impacts of the opening of the St Helena 
international airport (scheduled for 2016). 
 
In this introductory section we set out the context for the Social Welfare Review. We 
first describe the social security system in April 2011 after the implementation of the 
changes recommended by Alan Thompson. Next we explain our approach to the 
review and the constraints we encountered and summarise the issues that emerged 
from the review that lead to recommendations for further change. Each of these 
issues is treated separately, in distinct sections, in the rest of the report. 
 
The main focus of the review was on the changes in 2011 and there is an emphasis 
in this report on issues relating to adequacy and administration in relation to Basic 
Island Pension and Income Related Benefit. Other issues connected with the wider 
welfare system of St Helena also emerged in the course of the review and we have 
made some observations and recommendations about these too.  
 
In preparing this Report we have had the benefit of seeing a first draft of the 2013-
2018 St Helena Social Policy Plan which we understand will not go out to 
consultation until 10 May 2013. This may need to be taken into account if this Report 
is intended for wider circulation before then. 
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1.2 The social security system after April 2011 
In 2010 the Social Security Ordinance was passed. For the first time on St Helena 
some social security entitlements had a basis in law rather than policy. Two benefits 
were established by the Ordinance, the Basic Island Pension (BIP) and Income 
Related Benefit (IRB). The secondary legislation to support the Ordinance was 
passed in 2011, in the form of the Social Security Regulations. Regulations made 
under the Ordinance also introduced a temporary Transitionally Protected award of 
IRB for claimants who migrated from old benefits to the new system but who would 
have received a lower award under the new arrangements. A number of other 
benefits and payments are based only on policy. They were not translated into law in 
2011. These included Unemployment Allowance (UA), Disability Allowance (DA), 
Carers Allowance (CA) and Occupational Therapy payments (OT). The table below 
sets out the main features of each benefit.  
 
 
Table 1.1  The main social security and other benefits on St Helena 
 
Benefit  Basis Main features Weekly amounts (in February 2013) 
Basic Island 
Pension  
Law - Paid to over 65s 
- Based on years working on St 
Helena (or equivalent time spent 
caring or unavailable  due to 
disability)  
- Reduced payments where claimant 
receives other pension income 
- Stopped after 90 days absence from 
St Helena  
Full: £49.07 
75%: £36.80 
50%: £24.54 
Income Related 
Benefit (IRB) 
Law - Available to all people with low 
incomes 
- Based on household means test 
£47.22 (basic level for 
a single person) 
Transitionally 
protected IRB 
(known as TP) 
Law - Payable to former recipients of IRB 
who would have had a lower award 
under new arrangements. 
- Levels of award under old system 
maintained. 
Variable  
Unemployment 
Allowance  
Policy - Paid to unemployed people who are 
required to actively seek work 
£15.08 
Disability Allowance  Policy - Paid to people assessed as disabled 
by an authorised doctor 
£9.45  
Carers allowance  Policy - Paid to people caring for a disabled 
relative  
£41.00 full rate 
£26.50 reduced rate 
Occupational 
Therapy Payment  
Policy - Paid to eligible people working in 
SHAPE 
£30.52 
 
At the time of the visit by Roy Sainsbury in February 2013 the number of people 
receiving these benefits was approximately as follows: 
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Table 1.2 Approximate number of recipients of the main social security and 
related benefits (February 2013) 
 
Benefit/payment  Number of recipients 
Basic Island Pension  587 
Income Related Benefit  196 
Transitional Protection Payment 58 
Unemployment Allowance  21 
Disability Allowance  99 
Carers allowance  17 
Occupational Therapy Payment  24 
 
The majority of St Helenians over age 65 receive the Basic Island Pension. It is not 
possible to provide an exact percentage because of the lack of up to date data on 
the population of the Island. However, in the 2008 Census there were 714 over-65s. 
Using this as the latest accurate figure we can estimate (based on the current 
number of recipients, 587) that between 80-85% receive BIP. In addition a further 50 
over-65s receive IRB (but not BIP) meaning that around 90% of over-65s receive 
some income from the social security system. The characteristics of the remaining 
10% is not known but will include people with incomes high enough to exclude them 
from BIP and IRB, and people who do not qualify for BIP but are in households with 
an combined income too high to qualify for IRB.  
 
Of the 196 IRB recipients 112 (57%) were retired people. Only 41 (21%) were 
couples or single people with children. Twenty-two were unemployed. Ninety-four 
per cent of Transitional Protection payments were made to retired people (66%) or 
people in receipt of Occupational Therapy payments (28%). 
 
In total only 32 people were unemployed and receiving a benefit (some on 
Unemployment Allowance alone, the rest receiving UA and IRB). This represents 
under 1% of the population of St Helena and is therefore extremely low compared 
with most other countries. 
1.3 The purpose of the Review 
Throughout the Review we have attempted to address the following questions set 
out in the original terms of reference drawn up by SHG. 
 
1. Is the policy intent appropriate? 
2. Is the new system effectively targeted at those groups and individuals who need 
protection? 
3. Are the benefit levels appropriate and are they set against clear poverty criteria? 
4. Are eligibility criteria appropriately defined and implemented? 
5. Are uprating procedures clear and how can they be improved? 
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6. Are the legislative, institutional and social policy frameworks fit for delivering 
welfare benefits? 
1.4 Approach taken to the Social Welfare Review; constraints; summary 
of issues emerging 
In carrying out the review we wanted to give all the key stakeholders the opportunity 
of raising any issues about the social welfare system that they wanted. We posed all 
the people consulted the questions: 
x What is working well? 
x What is not working well? 
x What are the problems with the current system? 
x What could be done to address the problems? 
 
From the answers to these questions we identified the key areas of concern and 
drawing on the ideas of the people we spoke to and on knowledge of social security 
in the UK and elsewhere we developed a number of options for change. 
 
Throughout the review we have also drawn on a range of official and other 
documents, including: 
x Legislation  
x Policy documents  
x Papers prepared by Alan Thompson and by the former Social Policy Planner, 
Ann Muir 
x Management information provided (or produced specifically for the review) on 
social security claimants. 
 
Papers by Alan Thompson were difficult to obtain and it is not clear whether we had 
access to all his work prior to the April 2011 reforms. In addition, in the course of the 
review it became apparent that statistical data on social security is currently limited 
and not easily accessible. This hampered the review and we have views on how this 
can be improved later in the report (in sHFWLRQRQµ&RPSXWHULVDWLRQ¶ 
 
As expected, a wide range of issues was raised in the discussions with the key 
stakeholders. They are listed in the table below with reference to the relevant section 
in this report. 
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Section Issues 
2 Adequacy and uprating of benefits, including Child Benefit  
3 Targeting of benefits: Definition of household 
4 Targeting of benefits: Basic Island Pension qualifying criteria 
5 BIP and IRB: evidence issues 
6 The wider social policy framework: Unemployment Allowance, Disability 
Allowance, Carers Allowance, Occupational Therapy payments 
7 Operational issues ± computerisation; the role the Claims Office; appeals 
1.5 Outstanding issues not covered in this Review 
As mentioned earlier, the focus of the Review has been on the changes introduced 
in 2011 although there were a number of other issues that emerged in the course of 
our work. Some of these issues were closely associated with BIP, IRB and 
Unemployment Allowance and we have therefore made some attempt to explore 
them in this report. Unfortunately, it was not possible to investigate a number of other 
issues in any depth and we restrict ourselves here to the suggestion that they should 
be included in the policy development work that will continue after the submission of 
this Review. 
 
These are: 
x Support for housing costs within IRB  
x The case for a Guardians Allowance (for people who are not natural parents 
bringing up children) 
x Setting the National minimum wage  
x Tax thresholds and rates. 
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2.  Adequacy and uprating of benefits, including Child Benefit  
2.1 Introduction  
In this section we present our findings on some of the principal questions of the 
Review: 
1. Are the benefit levels appropriate and are they set against clear poverty criteria? 
2. Are uprating procedures clear and how can they be improved? 
3. Is the new system effectively targeted at those groups and individuals who need 
protection? 
 
We first consider the questions of adequacy and uprating in relation to Basic Island 
Pension and Income Related Benefit. This leads to the strong recommendation to 
adopt a minimum income standards approach to setting benefit levels and 
uprating benefits.  
 
We then consider an important issue of relevance to the third question above. The 
issue is whether families with children are adequately supported through the social 
security system. The conclusion reached here is that there is a strong case for 
introducing a payment to families along the lines of universal Child Benefit in the UK. 
2.2  Views on adequacy of BIP and IRB  
At the time of the Review BIP was being paid at three rates: 
x Highest rate (for 30+ qualifying years)  £49.07 
x Middle rate (for 25-30 qualifying years)  £36.80 
x Lower rate (for 20-25 qualifying years)  £24.54 
 
Because IRB is a means tested benefit it is paid at the appropriate for each 
LQGLYLGXDOFODLPEDVHGRQDµSRYHUW\OLQH¶IRUWKHKRXVHKROGWKDWWDNHVLQWRDFFRXQW 
the number of people in a household, any disabilities they might have, and housing 
costs. Transitional Protection (TP) payments also varied by individual claim. 
 
In broad financial terms the two new benefits BIP and new IRB were designed to 
have a combined cost equivalent to the cost of IRB in year 2010/2011. TP 
expenditure was additional. It was clear therefore that the BIP and IRB levels had 
been determined by a financial limit and not based on any objective assessment of 
poverty levels or needs. 
 
We received evidence from members of the Legislative Council, representatives of 
civil society organisations and from individual members of the public that for many 
people and their families the level of benefit they received created hardship for them. 
There were particular concerns about the cost of food and utilities, and imminent and 
persistent increases in the latter. In the absence of any recent data on incomes and 
expenditures it was not possible to quantify the extent of hardship, but the evidence 
that was collected suggested that a more objective method of setting benefit levels 
was needed. 
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2.3 Adequacy, uprating and minimum income standards 
Because there was an urgent need to advise SHG on the uprating of benefits due in 
October 2012 this work was carried out by Jonathan Bradshaw ahead of the rest of 
the Review. A report1 was produced for SHG in September 2012 and the October 
uprating was carried out. Of relevance for this wider Social Welfare Review however 
LVWKHUHSRUW¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQWKDW 
 
«PRUHZRUNLVGRQHRQOLYLQJVWDQGDUGVDQGSRYHUW\WKUHVKROGVWKHUHODWLRQVKLS
between in-work and out-of-work income and adequacy. The development of a St 
Helena Minimum Income Standard would greatly help consideration of these 
issues. 
 
This recommendation in September 2012 has already led to development work on a 
St Helena minimum income standard initially by Jonathan Bradshaw and staff of the 
Corporate Policy and Planning Unit, and more recently by the Social Policy Planner. 
 
We endorse and support this development work. In our view a St Helena minimum 
income standard can provide the basis for setting adequate BIP and IRB levels as 
well as providing a mechanism for uprating benefits in the future. It is also possible 
for minimum income standards to be used to help inform decisions about the level of 
the national minimum wage in future years. 
 
The fundamental principle of minimum income standards is to define and cost a 
basket of goods and services that represents an adequate standard of living for 
members of society. Importantly, deciding on what constitutes the goods and 
services in the basket is based on consensual methods that draw on the views of all 
members of society not just policy makers, officials or external experts. (This is 
similar to, but different from, a basket of goods used in the calculation of a retail price 
index. An RPI basket is based on what people actually spend their money on. It is a 
measure of spending that can be used to assess inflation not adequacy.) 
 
The minimum income standard approach has the advantage of being flexible. 
Separate standards can be developed for different groups of society. Given the 
current structure of the St Helena social security system we recommend that a 
minimum income standard is developed initially for (a) single people, (b) families, 
and (c) retirement pensioners. These can be used as the basis for deciding the 
levels of IRB (using (a) and (b)) and levels of BIP (using (c)). 
 
It is recognised that setting benefit levels must also consider other factors particularly 
the resources available to SHG, but the minimum income standard approach 
provides a rational and transparent basis for such considerations. If it is not possible 
to set levels that meet minimum income standards immediately then it might be 
possible to build them in to longer term plans and objectives for SHG.  
 
                                            
1
 Uprating Benefits. Policy Paper for the St Helena Government by Jonathan Bradshaw, Social Policy 
Research Unit Working Paper 2544, September 2012. 
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We are aware of the ongoing work on minimum income standards in SPPU. This will 
take time to complete but if there is a need for further input from the University of 
York we will happily discuss this.  
2.4 The case for a child benefit/allowance  
The case for supporting families bringing up children is widely accepted across the 
world and does not need to be rehearsed in detail here. Almost all countries in the 
developed world and increasing numbers in the developing world have devised 
mechanisms for making cash transfers to people raising children. Until recently the 
UK had a universal Child Benefit payable to all families regardless of income or 
resources (though this was changed in 2012 when Child Benefit became means 
tested). Other countries target assistance on people with low incomes through the 
benefit or tax systems. Most countries provide support regardless of employment 
status. 
 
St Helena has provided financial support for raising children in the past through a 
means tested child allowance of £8.75 for each child (though this was abolished in 
,WFRQWLQXHVWRGRVRWKURXJK,5%ZKHUHWKHFDOFXODWLRQRIWKHµSRYHUW\OLQH¶
used in the assessment of awards includes allowances for all children in the 
household. This poverty line becomes the maximum amount that can be paid. An 
actual award is reduced where there is other income or capital resources. The table 
below shows the effective cash value to people on IRB of having children in the 
family.2 
 
Table 2.1 IRB additions for children  
 
Number of children Value to IRB claimant (£ per week) 
1 18.89 
2 37.78 
3 56.66 
4 70.83 
 
These amounts are clearly helpful to the families that receive IRB. However no 
support is available to families not in receipt of IRB, including working families on low 
wages and older people looking after children (such as grandparents who receive a 
full Basic Island Pension). 
 
The lack of support for working families is particularly perverse. They are worse off 
working than being out of work and receiving IRB, as the following table illustrates, 
                                            
2
 7KHDGGLWLRQWRWKHµSRYHUW\OLQH¶IRUDFODLPDQWLVEDVHGRQWKHµPLQLPXPLQFRPHOHYHO¶IRUDQ
individual, currently £47.22 a week. The Social Security Regulations state that the poverty line is 
increased for children as follows: 
x for each of the first three children in the household, 40% of such minimum income level per child; 
x for each additional child, 30% of such minimum income level per additional child. 
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based on the National Minimum Wage of £2.30 that will come into force on 1 June 
2013. 
 
Table 2.2 Comparison of earnings and IRB for families with children  
 
Family  IRB (£) Earnings (one adult,  
40 hours @ £2.30) 
Net effect 
Couple plus 1 child 89.72 92 Better off by £2.28 
Couple plus 2 children  108.61 92 Worse off by £16.61 
Couple plus 3 children 127.49 92 Worse off by £35.49 
Couple plus 4 children 141.66 92 Worse off by £49.66 
 
To earn the same amount through working as they could receive in IRB a couple 
with two children would need to work a total of 47 hours a week between them at the 
minimum wage of £2.30 an hour. The equivalent number of hours for couples with 3 
and 4 children would be 55 and 62 hours a week.  
 
This is an unemployment trap of some severity and clearly the result of the lack of a 
child benefit/allowance for working families. It is a potential barrier to any family on 
IRB contemplating work and to families thinking about returning to St Helena from 
countries where Child Benefits are paid, and will do nothing to persuade families to 
stay on the Island rather than moving off Island to work. The current arrangements 
can be seen therefore as detrimental to the aims and aspirations of the 2012-2015 St 
Helena Sustainable Development 3ODQZKLFKLQFOXGHVDµYLEUDQWHFRQRP\SURYLGLQJ
RSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUDOOWRSDUWLFLSDWH¶DVRQHRILWVNational Goals. 
 
It is recommended that SHG works towards the introduction of a child 
benefit/allowance as soon as possible. There are many ways in which this can be 
done. A paper in 2011 by the former Social Policy Planner sets out the main options 
and provides some indicative costs (appropriate to the time)3. There are advantages 
to adopting a single allowance payable for all children and regardless of parental 
employment status or income. It is an explicit recognition of the value of child rearing 
for the whole of society and it is very simple and cheap to administer. It does not 
contribute to the employment trap as entitlement is maintained when moving into 
work. However, targeting child benefit/allowance on the less well off is a common 
(and cheaper) approach in many countries achieved by means testing the 
untargeted subsidy or making the benefit taxable. 
 
There is much to consider in designing a child benefit/allowance that is appropriate 
to St Helena society and culture. However, the lack of such a benefit is a glaring 
omission in the current social welfare system contributing to hardship and damaging 
incentives to work.  
                                            
3
 Muir, Ann (2011) Information to support discussion about a child benefit in St Helena. 
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2.5 Conclusion  
This section has tackled two of the most important issues for the St Helena welfare 
system: the adequacy of benefits and the lack of a child benefit/allowance. Both of 
these issues are related to one key aim of St Helena social policy ± the alleviation of 
poverty.  
 
Our recommendations for the use of minimum income standards to provide the basis 
for benefit levels and uprating policy are already being acted upon. As mentioned 
above, we endorse and support this response from SHG. The recommendations on 
child allowances have serious financial consequences and need to be considered 
carefully. However, without the introduction of some form of financial support for 
families bringing up children then the long term aim of tackling poverty in families will 
be severely held back. 
 
 
 
Summary of recommendations 
 
2.1 Continue the development work on a minimum income standard for St 
Helena and as soon as practicable adopt a minimum income standards 
approach as the basis for setting and uprating benefit levels. 
 
2.2 SHG should work towards the introduction of a child benefit/allowance as 
soon as possible. 
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3. Targeting of benefits: Definition of household 
3.1 Introduction  
One of the key questions for the Review was: 
x Is the new system effectively targeted at those groups and individuals who need 
protection? 
 
We received a number of representations from members of the Legislative Council, 
representatives of civil society organisations and from individual members of the 
public that the way in which household income is treated in the rules of entitlement 
for Income Related Benefit has led to a range of problems for IRB claimants and for 
recipients of Transitional Protection (TP) payments.   
 
This section explains the issue and the consequences for IRB and TP claimants and 
suggests a remedy. 
3.2 Issues for Income Related Benefit  
Under the Social Security Ordinance a household is defined in the following way:  
 
³KRXVHKROG´means one or more persons (whether or not related), who live 
together in a dwelling and maintain a common living, sharing normal domestic 
tasks and expenditures, including the purchase, cooking and eating of food, and 
for purposes of determination of any benefit under this Ordinance, includes only 
such persons who are physically present in St Helena and who actually reside in 
such dwelling; and ³PHPEHU´in relation to a household shall be construed 
accordingly. 
 
For the purposes of IRB only one claim per household can be made, and eligibility 
for an award and the amount of an award are based on the income and resources of 
ALL members of a household. 
 
The practical effect of this is that some types of household are excluded from 
entitlement to IRB even though one or more of its members have no source of 
income. One example will suffice to show the resulting problem. 
 
A common form of household on St Helena is grandparents living with their 
grandchildren. Under current benefit rules if one of the grandchildren is in work and 
HDUQLQJDERYHWKHKRXVHKROGµSRYHUW\OLQH¶WKHQWKHKRXVHKROGZLOOKDYHQR
entitlement to IRB. The grandparent can therefore be left with no independent 
income at all and be totally financially dependent on a grandchild. We received 
evidence of a number of households where this situation existed. We were also told 
that this relationship of dependence created tensions and was a source of 
embarrassment and shame for many older people. In some instances it led to the 
break-up of the household. 
 
From the draft policy papers prepared by Alan Thompson it is possible to identify a 
clear expectation that families should provide for each other. For example, one paper 
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DUJXHVWKDW³« all members of the family living together as one household should 
VXSSRUWWKHIDPLO\DVDZKROH´7KLVLVDQRUPDWLYHYLHZWKDWQRGRXEWZRXOGILQGD
level of support within most societies not only St Helena. However, when translated 
into social security legislation it imposes an obligation on some members of a 
household to support others totally, as in the example above of a working grandchild 
living with a non-working grandparent.  
 
From discussions on St Helena it is clear that making some people dependent on 
others in this way was not, from their perspective, an intention of the 2011 changes. 
It is not possible however to put a figure on the number of people affected.  
 
In our view the current IRB Ordinance and Regulations do not deliver the desired 
policy outcome and should be changed. We suggest a different basis for entitlement 
based on the following principles:  
x &ODLPVIRU,5%VKRXOGEHEDVHGRQWKHµIDPLO\¶ 
x $µIDPLO\¶FRQVLVWVRIDQDGXOWDQ\SDUWQHUOLYLQJZLWKWKHPSOXVDQy children. 
 
The effect will be that grandparents living with grandchildren can make a claim for 
IRB in their own right that is based on an individual, not household, means test. This 
will give them an independent income and they would not be dependent on others 
for the costs of food, clothing, personal items etc.  
 
An objection to this recommendation is that it does not promote the aim of families 
supporting each other as much as possible, absolving younger members of a family 
from any obligation to their elders. There are two possible responses to this: 
a) take no action and accept that the distribution of costs and resources within 
households living together is not important enough an issue (either financially or 
politically) to be concerned with, or 
b) LQWURGXFHUHJXODWLRQVWKDWUHGXFHDFODLPDQW¶V,5%DZDUGWRUHIOHFWWKH
economies of scale of people living together. 
 
Option (b) would have the effect of reducing the income of the IRB claimant in a 
household and could therefore continue to create the tensions noted above that can 
lead ultimately to the break-up of households. Option (a) could be argued therefore 
as a policy lever to keep family households together. Alternatively, option (b) could 
be argued to be avoiding unnecessary public expenditure. Choosing between these 
options is a decision for SHG and the Legislative Council but if (b) is preferred then 
the minimum income standard approach will be able to provide a rational and 
transparent estimate of the appropriate level of any deduction (which we could call 
WKHµVKDUHGKRXVHKROGGHGXFWLRQ¶ 
 
For example, in a basket of goods and services for a couple there will be amounts 
allocated for the costs of rent and utilities. In a household comprising two 
independent adults (a grandparent IRB claimant and a working grandchild, for 
example) these costs could be deemed to be incurred equally and so an amount 
equal to half the rent and utilities components could be deducted from the IRB 
award. 
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Using this approach the deduction could be adjusted for different numbers of adults 
in the household.  
3.3 Issues for Transitional Protection payments  
The implementation of the household rules in the Social Security Ordinance has also 
had a negative impact on some people awarded a Transitional Protection payment of 
IRB. The problem has arisen when a person with a TP lives in the same household 
as a person getting BIP. The two new benefits have been subject to upratings in 
April and October 2012.  
 
The Transitional Protection rules are intended to protect household income at April 
2011 levels. The rules do not protect the level of awards to individuals however. 
Households with a member in receipt of TP will always be better off than similar 
households that made new claims for benefit after 2011 until such time that the new 
levels of benefit catch up with the old. This seems to have been poorly understood at 
the time. 
 
What has happened in both April and October 2012 is that in households where 
someone has experienced an increase in their BIP the person receiving TP has 
experienced a corresponding decrease in the (protected) IRB. In this way the 
household income is maintained although the amounts that each person brings to 
the household changes.  
 
The perception of many households is that they are being disadvantaged by a 
decrease in benefit (i.e. TP) when (a) others are receiving an increase and (b) when 
prices are continuing to rise. Many have felt that the promise in 2011 that no-one 
would lose out from the reform of IRB and the introduction of BIP has proved to be 
false. 
 
A separate but related complaint has been made by some people on only TP (i.e. 
with no other benefits coming into the household). They too perceive that they are 
being penalised because their benefit has not risen during a time when prices have 
gone up. However, again in objective terms, their household income has been 
maintained at a level higher than people in similar circumstances.  
 
The total number of TP recipients in February 2013 was 59. It is not known how 
many people have experienced either of the problems described above.  
 
The problems with Transitional Protection payments are particularly delicate. It could 
be argued that TP is having exactly the intended policy intention of maintaining 
household incomes at April 2011 levels when they would have fallen under the new 
system. However, in practice people have undoubtedly experienced a fall in living 
standards because of the combination of a constant level of benefit income and 
inflationary increases in the costs of goods and services since 2011. There appear to 
be three main options in response to the problem: 
a) maintain the current arrangements for TP, or 
b) amend the Social Security Regulations to provide increases in TP, or 
c) offer a one-off compensatory payment. 
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Option (a) requires no legislative or administrative action. What it would require 
however is a campaign of education and persuasion to explain to the affected 
claimants that they are being treated fairly despite not having any increases in 
overall benefit income for the household. The fairness argument is based on a 
comparison with other claimants in the same circumstances as themselves who 
claimed after April 2011. Protected claimants would need to be convinced that they 
are actually getting preferential treatment by being better off than new claimants.  
 
Option (b) undermines the rationale for introducing transitional payments. It would 
effectively introduce a two-tier IRB system with higher payments for the fortunate few 
who were IRB recipients before April 2011. Because it would set a precedent for 
increasing TP at the same time as uprating other benefit levels it would also prolong 
the period (potentially indefinitely) for which TP would be paid.  
 
The third option is a compromise. A ex gratia payment could be made in recognition 
of inflationary price rises. This would mean that TP could still be phased out in the 
next few years as intended.  
3.4 Conclusion   
There needs to be a political decision on whether or not to implement the 
recommendation to replace the household means test for IRB above. The decision 
will need to be informed by an assessment of the additional costs of changing the 
Ordinance and Regulations in the way suggested. There will be costs from 
increasing the value of awards to some existing IRB claimants and by making a 
number of others newly eligible for an award where currently they are not entitled. 
 
It should be possible to make an assessment of the cost of increased awards but it is 
also likely that changes would prompt some new claims from people (such as 
grandparents) who currently do not receive any IRB at all. The number of new claims 
that might arise is less easy to predict. Nevertheless an attempt will need to be 
made, utilising as far as possible data from the last Census and Household 
Expenditure Survey. The number of disallowed claims to date might also be a useful 
indication of the scale of new awards. 
 
If the recommendations here are accepted then work on amending the Ordinance 
and Regulations should be commenced as soon as possible. 
 
A policy decision is needed on which of the options presented above in relation to 
Transitional Protection payments should be taken. 
 
Options (b) and (c) could be costed if either is seen as politically desirable. 
Transitional payments are not part of the Social Security Ordinance. Any changes 
would therefore only require changes to the Regulations.  
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Summary of recommendations 
 
3.1 Change the basis of IRB awards from household to families (defined as 
claimant, partner and children). 
 
3.2 Draft changes to the Social Security Ordinance to effect this change. 
 
3.3 8QGHUWDNHIXUWKHUZRUNRQDSRVVLEOHµVKDUHGKRXVHKROGGHGXFWLRQ¶WRWDNH
into account the economies of scale of people living together and sharing 
household costs. 
 
3.4 Undertake further work on options whether or not to increase the income of 
TP recipients in recognition of rising prices.  
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4. Targeting of benefits: Basic Island Pension qualifying 
criteria 
4.1 Introduction  
One of the key questions for the Review was: 
x Is the new system effectively targeted at those groups and individuals who need 
protection? 
 
As part of the Social Welfare Review we collected evidence from a range of sources 
on whether the Basic Island Pension was actually achieving this aim of targeting 
people who need protection. 
 
It is worth noting at this stage that the Basic Island Pension was a popular policy 
innovation among all the stakeholders consulted in this Review. People found it easy 
to understand and supported the rationale that entitlement should be based on 
useful contributions to the life and society of St Helena, either through working or 
caring.  
 
In principle BIP had unanimous support although there was dissatisfaction with some 
aspects of the benefit (discussed below). No-one advocated a return to the previous 
system where people who had retired only had access to Income Related Benefit. It 
is our view therefore that BIP as defined in the Social Security Ordinance and 
Regulations should be maintained as a core component of the St Helena welfare 
system.  
 
The essential components of BIP relevant to this Review are as follows: 
x Paid to over 65s 
x Based on years working on St Helena (or equivalent time spent caring or not 
able to work due to disability)  
x Reduced payments where claimant receives other pension income   
x Stopped after 90 days absence from St Helena. 
 
7KHPD[LPXPSHQVLRQLVDYDLODEOHWR6DLQWVZKRKDYHDFFXPXODWHGµTXDOLI\LQJ
\HDUV¶GXULQJWKHLUZRUNLQJOLIHWLPHWRTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUVHQWLWOHVDFODLPDQWWRD
75% pension, and 20 to 25 years to a 50% pension. Below 20 years there is no 
entitlement.  
 
In the course of the Review evidence was put forward about the following perceived 
problems with the current rules for BIP: 
a) There is no BIP entitlement for people who have worked fewer than 20 years. 
b) Work off island, including on Ascension Island and the Falkland Islands, does 
QRWFRXQWWRZDUGVµTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶ 
c) Work after the age of 65 does not count towards qualifying years.  
d) Retirement age of 65 adversely affects some current 60-65 year olds. 
e) Loss of entitlement if the claimant is off island for over 90 days. 
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f) Reduction in BIP award if claimant receives pension from another source. 
g) Difficulty in providing evidence of working, caring or being disabled. 
 
The rest of this section deals with each of these issues in turn. 
4.2 The impact of the current definition of qualifying years 
As noted above a person only has entitlement to Basic Island Pension if they have 
DFFXPXODWHGDWOHDVWµTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶7KHHIIHFWRIWKH current rules on Basic 
Island Pension eligibility is that some claimants, although they are over 65 years old 
are excluded from benefit receipt because they do not have the minimum 20 
qualifying years.  
 
We received representations that this is unfair on people who had under 20 
qualifying years. The argument that was made is that any number of qualifying years 
represented some contribution to St Helena society and deserved recognition. In 
particular the rules were criticised for being harsh on people who had near to but still 
below 20 years.  
 
Others receive either the middle or the lower rate of pension because they do not 
reach the 30 qualifying years needed to receive the maximum pension. All of these 
types of claimant may therefore need to claim Income Related Benefit instead of or 
as well as BIP.  
 
As mentioned above the core principle of linking pension entitlement to useful 
contributions to St Helena life and society was strongly supported by the people 
consulted in this Review. One way of strengthening this support would be to 
introduce additional bands of benefit to recognise 15, 10 and 5 qualifying years. For 
example, BIP could be awarded according to the following tariff: 
 
Table 4.1 Possible extension of entitlement to Basic Island Pension  
 
Qualifying years Rate of Basic Island Pension (%) 
30+ 100 
25-29 75 
20-24 50 
15-19 40 
10-14 25 
5-9 10 
 
It is recommended that making changes along these lines (or some variation) should 
be debated and considered within SHG and the Legislative Council. On one level the 
change would be largely symbolic, extending the provision of a pension to more 
people. In practice, anyone who received one of the lower rates would probably still 
need to apply for IRB so there would be no effect on their overall total income or the 
cost to the social security budget. 
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A possible disadvantage is increased administrative work because people with 
between 5 and 20 qualifying years would most likely need two claims processing - 
for BIP and for IRB - instead of just one at present (for IRB). 
4.3 Work off island 
Many people work off island at some point in their working lives. Such work does not 
FRQWULEXWHWRµTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶DWSUHVHQW4. There was some dissatisfaction with this. 
The argument was made that working off island was actively encouraged in St 
Helena society as a means of supplementing the incomes of family members who 
remained on the island. These remittances were seen as a positive contribution to 
the economy of St Helena therefore. As far as we know however there is no 
comprehensive measure of such remittances. However, some partial figures 
supplied by the SHG Statistics Office show that in 2011/12 around £2.4 million was 
transferred from individuals working on Ascension Island to accounts in the Bank of 
St Helena. It is also estimated that a further 10% (i.e. around a quarter of a million 
pounds) is transferred informally, via gifts and purchases. The contribution to the 
economy of St Helena of people working abroad is therefore seemingly quite 
substantial. 
 
The policy option arises therefore to include time spent working abroad as valid 
qualifying years for people who return to the island. Taking this option would reflect 
one of the features of St Helena life that is distinct compared for example with the 
UK. For St Helenians working abroad is far more common than the UK and seen as 
a mix of desirable and necessary in order to increase the incomes of workers 
themselves and their families back home, and to increase the skills base of Saints. 
 
There would be a cost to the social security budget of taking this option as more 
people would be entitled to Basic Island Pension compared with the present. 
However, this cost would be partially offset by a reduction in the IRB paid to people 
not currently receiving BIP. It is recommended that further work is undertaken within 
SHG to estimate the net costs. However, costing would only be necessary if a 
decision is taken in principle that overseas work should count towards qualifying 
years. 
4.4 Work after the age of 65 
8QGHUFXUUHQW%,3UXOHVµTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶DUHRQO\FRXQWHGEHWZHHQWKHDJHVRI
and 65 (the retirement age). There was some dissatisfaction with this, particularly in 
the context of (a) people commonly spending some of their time working abroad, and 
(b) the difficulty in providing evidence of working from many years before.  
 
The scenario was presented to us of a person who had worked away from the Island 
for a number of years so that they had only accumulated, say, 18 qualifying years up 
to the age of 65. They then worked for a further five years to the age of 70. Under 
current rules these final five years would not count as qualifying years and so there 
                                            
4
 It is possible for example for someone to spend a large part of their working life on Ascension Island 
then return to St Helena to work perhaps 18 or 19 years before retirement and qualify for no pension 
at all despite a full working life. 
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would still be no entitlement to Basic Island Pension even though the person had 
been working on island for a total of over 20 years. 
 
The second scenario was that because of the difficulty of proving an employment 
record a person may only be able to show, say 18 years verifiable employment up to 
the age of 65. Similarly to the example above they could then work another five 
years and still not have an entitlement to BIP.  
 
,QSULQFLSOHWKHUHLVDVWURQJDUJXPHQWIRUFKDQJLQJWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶
to include work after 65 years of age. The current rules do not appear to satisfy any 
discernible policy aims. On the contrary they convey the message that working 
beyond retirement age is not valued. It is not known how many people are adversely 
affected by the current rules in this way, but it is unlikely to be many. 
4.5 Retirement age of 65 adversely affects some current 60-65 year olds 
Income Related Benefit prior to 2011 was available to any person over 60 years of 
age. In practice this led to many Saints retiring at 60 and claiming IRB (which acted 
therefore as a de facto retirement benefit). When BIP was introduced for the over 
VRQO\WKHUHZHUHDQXPEHURIµUHWLUHG¶SHRSOHLQWKH-65 age bracket who were 
not eligible for BIP and so became eligible to IRB in its post-2011 form. Because 
many of these were receiving higher amounts of IRB under the old system than they 
were entitled to under the reformed IRB they became eligible for a Transitional 
Protection payment. Hence there is a group of older Saints on TP who will not have 
experienced an increase in their benefit income since 2011. This is another 
dissatisfied group who feel disadvantaged by the 2011 changes. 
 
In addition a problem arises because of the official retirement age within SHG, which 
is currently 60 (though set to rise incrementally to 65 commencing in 2014). This has 
meant that many people have been obliged to stop work but who are not eligible for 
the Basic Island Pension. They can only claim the means tested IRB, and for some 
their retirement income is too high to qualify. Many feel aggrieved at effectively 
ORVLQJWKHLUPDLQVRXUFHRILQFRPHE\µEHLQJIRUFHGWRUHWLUH¶EXWVLPXOWDQHRXVO\
being denied the state pension.  
 
This is a particularly difficult and sensitive issue. It does not seem a proportionate 
response to reduce the qualifying age for BIP to 60. (In contrast many countries, 
including the UK, are in the process of raising the pension age in response to the 
growing costs of pensions and the improving health and longevity of older people 
that mean they are capable of extending their working lives.) 
 
The mismatch between occupational pension ages and state pension ages is 
common to many countries and the anomaly is often accepted and tolerated as a 
slightly inequitable consequence of generous occupational schemes rather than as a 
failure of retirement policy. Taking no action and maintaining the status quo is an 
option therefore that would find some precedent in other countries.  
 
However, there is a policy response that might have some merit in considering. 
There is an option to introduce an age-related rate of IRB for the over-60s. This 
might help some people by giving them an increase in income but it would be small 
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and would not address the fundamental issue of denying people BIP whilst being 
µSHQVLRQHUV¶RI6+* 
4.6 Loss of entitlement if the claimant is off island for over 90 days 
Under current BIP rules entitlement ceases after a recipient is temporarily absent for 
more than 90 days (roughly three months) or immediately if they are leaving St 
Helena permanently. This rule has no equivalent in the UK. UK pensioners who 
satisfy the eligibility criteria can continue to receive their pension during absences 
abroad. If they leave the UK permanently however the level of the pension does not 
increase from its initial value. 
 
It is hard to find a justification for the St Helena restriction, which attracted some 
criticism during the Review. In particular it was seen as unfair because it was not 
uncommon for pensioners sometimes to spend between three and six months 
visiting family abroad (and occasionally longer). Such long visits were planned and 
undertaken because of the high cost of visiting places like the UK and South Africa. 
They could only be undertaken rarely. 
 
According to figures supplied by the Claims Office there have been 22 cases to date 
where BIP has been stopped because of the 90 day rule. It is unclear what policy 
purpose is served by the rule apart from saving a small amount of money for the 
social security budget. It is recommended therefore that consideration is given to 
abolishing the rule. It is unpopular and perceived as unfair. There are few cases so 
the cost of change would not be great. 
4.7 Reduction in BIP award if claimant receives pension from another 
source 
Under current BIP rules the amount of an award of BIP is reduced if a claimant has 
income from a separate pension source (such as from SHG, Solomons, or a UK 
pension fund). Some people contributing to the Review objected to this rule in 
principle. The argument was that it was a disincentive to participation in an 
RFFXSDWLRQDORUSULYDWHSHQVLRQVFKHPHDQGZDVSHUFHLYHGDVDµSXQLVKPHQW¶IRU
prudent financial behaviour in the past. 
 
The current rules are effectively a form of means testing, reducing the amount of BIP 
for people with higher levels of resources. For comparison, the situation in the UK is 
that the basic retirement pension is not means tested and entitlement is not affected 
by other forms of income including occupational and other pensions. Having said 
that, it is possible to see some rationale for the St Helena policy. For example, SHG 
pensions until 2010 have been non-contributory. Ex SHG employees therefore have 
enjoyed a considerable advantage compared with other workers on the Island. A 
means tested BIP is therefore a way of targeting scarce resources away from people 
who are privileged in this way. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a clear policy option of changing the current rules in St Helena 
so that additional pension income is not taken into account in the calculation of BIP. 
This is likely to be one of the more costly options considered in this report. It might 
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be possible to estimate the cost of paying full pensions (i.e. based on qualifying 
years) to existing BIP recipients, but it might be more difficult to estimate the number 
of new claimants who would become eligible by removing the current means test. 
4.8 Evidence rules for working, caring or being disabled 
As mentioned above the principle on which a person becomes entitled to BIP is that 
they have contributed to St Helena life and society by working, bringing up children 
or caring for others, or have been prevented from doing so for reasons of disability. 
This principle is well-supported on St Helena. 
 
However, turning this principle into workable legislative and administrative rules is 
not easy. The rules that were introduced in 2011 can be seen as reasonable 
because they reflected what was feasible at the time. The table is an attempt to 
summarise the current rules and evidence requirements. 
 
Table 4.2 Current evidence requirements for Basic Island Pension  
 
Valid activity/status What counts 
Working in paid employment  Any year in which 6 months were spent in a 
combination of paid and unpaid employment 
FRXQWVDVDµTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶ Working in unpaid employment  
Bringing up children All years spent looking after a child up to the age 
RIILYHDUHµTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶7RWDOTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV
can therefore exceed five when more than one 
child is being raised. 
Caring for a dependant Years spent looking after a person whilst ALSO in 
receipt of a Carer's Allowance are counted as 
qualifying years  
Being disabled Years in receipt of a Disability Allowance count as 
qualifying years  
 
The difficulties in producing evidence that is satisfactory for audit purposes are the 
subject of section 5. 
 
An additional issue arises in the way that the rules on caring and on being disabled 
tend to disadvantage some people and exclude them from benefit. We were cited 
examples of people who had been caring for a dependant before the introduction of 
Carer's Allowance in the late 1980s. These early years spent caring could not 
therefore be counted as qualifying years. Similarly, Disability Allowance was only 
introduced in the late 1980s, so any years before then cannot count towards 
qualifying years.  
 
The overall impact is that some people cannot qualify for a Basic Island Pension (or 
only qualify for a 75% or 50% pension) even though they were actually caring or 
were themselves disabled for parts of their working age years. Confronted with this 
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outcome it seems that the question of whether BIP is reaching its intended target 
SRSXODWLRQKDVWREHDQVZHUHG³QRW´ 
 
One policy response would be to accept different evidence for caring or being 
disabled. Such evidence need not be specified in regulations but should include ANY 
evidence that can support a claim. For disabled people this might include hospital or 
other medical records. The use of the balance of probabilities, as discussed further 
in section 5, could then be used to assess the evidence and decide cases. 
4.9 Conclusion  
This section has addressed a range of issues that have arisen in the nearly two 
years since the introduction of the Basic Island Pension. The introduction of BIP has 
clearly been a popular and effective policy innovation. However, as it was originally 
configured in 2011 it has to be questioned whether it is really acting in entirely the 
way that policy makers intended. 
 
This Review has revealed the extent to which some people are disadvantaged by the 
current rules and has suggested remedies. All of these remedies have costs 
associated with them. Choosing which, if any, changes should be made, and when 
these can be made is not the task of the Review Team however. The choices are 
ultimately political decisions about affordability and priorities. However, some options 
have a stronger underpinning and we present them as recommendations here. 
Others have a wider range of pros and cons and we do not feel sufficiently confident 
to be able to make firm recommendations on them. They remain options for 
consideration and debate. 
 
 
 
Summary of recommendations 
4.1 Extend BIP entitlement to people working fewer than 20 years on St 
Helena. 
4.2 &RXQWZRUNRIILVODQGDVFRQWULEXWLQJWR%,3µTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶ 
4.3 &RXQWZRUNDIWHUWKHDJHRIWRZDUGVµTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶ 
4.4 Remove the rule imposing loss of entitlement for claimants off island for 
over 90 days.  
4.5 Allow a greater range of evidence of working, caring or being disabled. 
4.6 Give further consideration to:  
x Increasing the incomes of retired 60-65 year olds. 
x Abolishing reductions in BIP award for claimants receiving pension 
from another source. 
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5 BIP and IRB evidence issues5 
5.1 Introduction  
In the course of the visit to the Island by Roy Sainsbury in February 2013 the 
important issue of the quality of evidence on BIP and IRB claims was raised. The 
issue had become urgent because of the likely prospect of the SHG Financial 
Statements for 2011-12 being qualified on the basis of a lack of supporting 
documentation for claims to IRB and BIP following the first audit of the new system 
carried out in Summer 2012 (and reported in July 2012).  
5.2 Background: The imminent qualification of the SHG financial 
statements 
The audit perspective is clearly set out in July 2012 Audit Report and the August 
2012 Memo from the then Chief Auditor to the Financial Secretary. The lack of 
supporting information in the records of BIP and IRB means that a basic task of audit 
- to check assessments and ensure that correct payments have been made - has not 
been possible. Hence it is our understanding that the accounts for 2011-12 are likely 
to be qualified when they are finalised in due course. 
 
In our view there is no practicable way of affecting this outcome. In February 2013 
there were around 602 recipients of BIP and 196 recipients of IRB. Based on the 
audit report finding that only six of the 31 cases (roughly 20%) scrutinised had any 
supporting information it is reasonable to estimate that perhaps around 480 of the 
existing BIP awards and around 160 IRB claims are lacking supporting information. 
The only way in which audit requirements could be met therefore would be to 
reassess all of these awards and requesting evidence of entitlement from the 
recipients. In our view this would be a lengthy, time-consuming and costly exercise 
that could not be done in time to have an impact on the audit assessment. 
 
We suggest therefore that no action is taken in response to the forthcoming audit 
report. Instead efforts should be made to make changes to the adjudication process 
that will ensure that evidence in support of claims is sought in the future and 
recorded (and therefore available for audit inspection later). 
5.3 Avoiding qualification of accounts in the future 
To address the issue of avoiding qualification in future we propose an Action Plan 
comprising immediate, medium term and longer term changes to the St Helena 
social security system.  
                                            
5
 Because of the urgency of this issue an interim report was prepared and submitted in March 2013. 
This section largely reproduces this report but is integrated here so that the Social Welfare Review 
has a single, comprehensive output. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of evidence issues on BIP and IRB  
 
 
Issue Recommendations 
1. Lack of supporting 
evidence for BIP claims in 
the future 
,QWURGXFHDµ%,3GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURWRFRO¶WRHVWDEOLVKD
clear and auditable process for collecting and considering 
evidence and for making decisions. 
$GRSWWKHSULQFLSOHRIWKHµEDODQFHRISUREDELOLW\¶DVWKH
standard of proof in social security decision making.  
2. Lack of supporting 
evidence for existing BIP 
claims 
2.1 Consider the feasibility and timing of a review of the stock 
of BIP awards based on the decision making protocol 
3. Prospective lack of 
evidence of employment 
in the future 
3.1 Consider the option of establishing a St Helena 
employment record that could form the basis of BIP decision 
making in the future. 
4. Manipulation of bank 
accounts to avoid tariff 
income 
4.1 Amend the Social Security Ordinance to include a section 
RQµGHSULYDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHV¶ 
4.2 Mount education and publicity campaign to explain why 
changes are justified. 
5. Incomplete administrative 
instructions 
5.1 Revise current drafts to include other changes 
consequent to the Social Welfare Review. 
 
The following sections set out an analysis of the problem issues and the rationale for 
the recommendations in the Action Plan. 
5.4 The information problems of BIP  
5.4.1  Basic Island Pension information requirements  
Qualification for BIP relies on a claimant satisfying the following conditions: 
a)  being aged 65 years or older, 
b)  being physically present in St Helena, and  
c)  having completed at least 20 qualifying years in St Helena. 
 
µ4XDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶DUHGHILQHGDV 
i)  being engaged in employment (including self-employment) in St Helena and (in 
the case of self-employment) filing appropriate tax returns;  
ii)  having worked on a family farm or in a family business, regardless of whether or 
not the work was paid;  
iii)  having had a child under the age of five years or caring for a disabled child; or  
iv)  KDYLQJEHHQLQUHFHLSWRIDGLVDELOLW\SHQVLRQRUFDUHU¶VDOORZDQFHSDLGE\WKH
Government of St Helena.  
 
7KHDPRXQWRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V%,3DZDUGGHSHQGVRQWKHQXPEHURITXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV
and on receipt of other pension income (such as from SHG or from overseas). 
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These conditions and requirements is that they have a powerful logic to them that is 
appropriate to St Helena culture and society. Eligibility is clearly based on people 
having made a contribution to St Helena society in the form of paid and unpaid work, 
and time spent caring or, in contrast, being effectively denied those opportunities 
through long term disability. Because there has never been a National Insurance 
system on the Island (unlike in the UK where National Insurance was introduced in 
1911) it was never an option to base entitlement on insurance contributions. As 
mentioned in section 4 it was clear that the basis of the Basic Island Pension was 
both widely understood and supported by Councillors, officials and the public. 
 
5.4.2 Information deficits 
The difficulties with BIP arise because of the evidence requirements. Claimants 
declare their employment record on the claim form but according to the former Chief 
$XGLWRU³LWLVQHDUO\LPSRVVLEOHWRREWDLQHYLGHQFHRIWKHQXPEHURI\HDUVZorked 
RQWKHLVODQG´6 It must be remembered that for the first wave of current BIP 
recipients (aged 65 and over in 2011) some periods of relevant employment will 
have been in the 1960s and earlier. It is clearly unrealistic to expect claimants to 
provide much or any concrete evidence of employment so many years in the past, 
though SHG employees might have some relevant written records. Furthermore this 
situation is unlikely to change for many years. 
 
5.4.3 A way forward Ȃ a new BIP decision making protocol and process 
,QWKHLPPHGLDWHIXWXUHZHVXJJHVWWKDWDµBIP decision making protocol¶LV
defined for the Claims Officers that will help them collect as much evidence as 
possible and which will provide a sound basis for their decision making. This process 
must recognise the realities of St Helenian life over the previous decades, 
particularly the fact that employment records outside SHG are rare and frequently 
were not created or kept at all, especially as much employment, including unpaid 
work, was undertaken within family units where such records were an irrelevance.  
 
The decision making protocol will need development work, including input from the 
Law Office and Audit Department, but the principles should be as follows: 
 
x The decision making process should be clearly defined as having three stages: 
o Collection and scrutiny of evidence 
o Establishing the facts on which a decision will be made 
o Applying the relevant social security law to the facts. 
 
x For the first stage, the protocol should set out a range of evidence types that are 
appropriate. These will include: 
o Documentary evidence - for example, wage slips, long service awards, 
UHIHUHQFHVHPSOR\HU¶VOHWWHURIFRQILUPDWLRQ 
o Oral evidence - for example, a statement given verbally (such as in a 
telephone call)  
o Other tangible evidence ± for example, photographs.  
                                            
6
 Memo from (former) Chief Auditor to Financial Secretary, August 2012 (accessed March 2013). 
 
26 
The oral evidence could come directly from the claimant, or indirectly through a third 
party. It should be the job of the Claims Officer to help the claimant supply as much 
evidence as possible, although it will not be necessary to look for examples of all of 
them. Some types of evidence (such as written confirmation from an employer) will 
be sufficient without having to collect anything further. All evidence, and attempts to 
find evidence, should EHUHFRUGHGRQDFODLPDQW¶VFDVHILOH,WLVUHFRPPHQGHGWKDWD
VWDQGDUGµUHFRUGRIHYLGHQFH¶IRUPLVGHVLJQHGIRUWKLVSXUSRVH 
 
Having collected the evidence the next stage is to decide the facts of the case. This 
might be very straightforward in some, but probably only a minority of cases. The 
main facts to be decided in BIP claims are the periods of employment on St Helena. 
,QGHFLGLQJWKHIDFWVZHUHFRPPHQGWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKHµbalance of probability¶DV
the standard of proof. This is a well-established standard of proof used in civil law 
and has been used in social security decision making in the UK for many years. 
 
The balance of probability involves the decision maker deciding whether it is more 
likely than not that an event occurred, or that an assertion is true. It does not mean 
that the claimant can be given the benefit of the doubt. If the evidence is incomplete 
or contradictory the decision maker must decide whether there is enough evidence in 
favour of one conclusion or another and to show which is the more likely. 
 
7KHSURSRVHGµUHFRUGRIHYLGHQFH¶IRUPVKRXOGFRQWDLQDILQDOVHFWLRQWKDW
summarises the facts of the case and the reasons for them. This provides a 
transparent link between efforts to produce evidence and the decision on a claim that 
can be scrutinised internally by Managers within the Health and Social Welfare 
Directorate and externally by the Audit Department.  
 
For BIP the final stage of applying the law to the facts of the case is straightforward; 
the number of qualifying years dictates the level of the BIP award (before 
adjustments for other pension income, that is). 
 
5.4.4 Looking further forward 
The recommendations for a BIP decision making protocol are intended to apply to 
future claims for BIP not the current stock of cases. Ideally, the protocol should be 
applied to all cases to ensure that decisions made so far can be seen to be robust. 
However, as mentioned earlier this would be a lengthy, time-consuming and costly 
exercise. It is hard to estimate how long such an exercise would take but based on 
how long was needed to complete the latest uprating of benefits (20 person weeks 
for a relatively straightforward exercise) it can only be suggested that a review of all 
BIP cases would take many months. Current resources and levels of staffing suggest 
that this is not feasible at present but the option does remain of planning such a 
review in the future. However it does not seem to be a high priority at present. 
 
A more future-looking option is to introduce into St Helena some form of official 
HPSOR\PHQWUHFRUGWKDWFRXOGEHPDLQWDLQHGRYHUDSHUVRQ¶VZRUNLQJOLIHWLPHDQG
which could eventually be used as sufficient evidence for deciding BIP claims. The 
record would also include periods of child-rearing, caring and periods out of the 
labour market due to disability. There may be some merit in investigating whether St 
Helena tax records could serve the same purpose but in my understanding tax 
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records do not cover the whole working age population and in any case do not 
include periods of the other activities just mentioned. 
5.5 The information problems of Income Related Benefit  
5.5.1  IRB Information requirements  
,5%LVDIIHFWHGE\WKHOHYHORIDFODLPDQW¶VVDYLQJVDQGRWKHUDVVHWV6DYLQJVXQGHU
£3,000 do not affect the calculation of an award. Savings over this amount are 
GHHPHGWRJHQHUDWHDQRWLRQDOµWDULII¶LQFRPHRIDZHHNIRUHYHU\,000. 
Adjudication officers need therefore to obtain evidence of bank balances. 
 
5.5.2 Information deficits 
The information problems with IRB raised in the Audit Report concern: 
a) Verification of UK bank balances. 
b) Manipulation of on-island bank accounts to avoid the tariff income from savings. 
 
Problems in all these areas have contributed to the conclusion in the Audit Report to 
qualify the accounts for 2011-12. 
 
The problem with UK bank balances is firstly whether a claimant has one, and 
secondly gaining access to a bank statement. The existence of a UK bank account 
relies on the claimant declaring it on the IRB claim form. If no such declaration is 
made and the adjudication officers have no reason to suspect a false declaration 
then there appears to be no problem. If there is suspicion however a fraud 
investigation should be the appropriate response. If a UK bank account is declared 
then a bank balance can be requested, and failure to produce one will mean that the 
claim cannot be decided. 
 
5.5.3 A way forward Ȃ Ǯǯ
Security Ordinance 
The problem of manipulating bank balances in order to qualify for or maximise 
EHQHILWLQFRPHLVDIDPLOLDURQHIURPWKH8.DQGLVUHIHUUHGWRDVµGHSULYDWLRQRI
UHVRXUFHV¶,WLVLGHQWLILHGIURPEDQNstatements that must be provided by the 
FODLPDQW7KHFODLPIRUPUHTXLUHVWKHFODLPDQWWRVXSSO\WKHµPRVWUHFHQW¶VWDWHPHQW
without specifying the period covered though it must include the date of the claim. As 
in St Helena the figure for the amount of savings used in the calculation of an award 
relates to the date of claim only. If an unusual or suspicious movement of savings is 
found then the claimant is asked to justify it. There can of course be many legitimate 
reasons for using large amounts of cash so it cannot automatically be assumed that 
a claimant is trying to avoid a tariff income. However if no satisfactory explanation is 
forthcoming the adjudication officer can decide to use a different figure that reflects 
WKHFODLPDQW¶VVDYLQJVEHIRUHWKHµGHSULYDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHV¶ 
 
One obvious response to the problem identified in the Audit Report is to include in 
WKH6RFLDO6HFXULW\2UGLQDQFHDVHFWLRQRQµGHSULYDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHV¶PRGHOOHGRQ
the UK legislation, and to make the provision of a bank statement a condition of 
receiving benefit. However, this should be handled sensitively. From my experience 
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on island it became apparent that some people consider their bank accounts to be 
very private and not the business of SHG. It would seem wise therefore to inform 
and educate the St Helena public in advance about the reasons for making changes 
which they otherwise might react against.  
5.6 Conclusion  
It should be noted that this section is intended to inform the final Audit Report for 
2011-12 by suggesting an Action Plan that addresses the problems it identified with 
current decision making processes. It hopefully provides some reassurance that the 
problems are not insurmountable although some will require some time and effort to 
overcome.  
 
The balance of probability approach to decision making should probably not require 
legislation. It is not in the UK legislation as far as we know. The advice and views of 
WKH/DZ2IILFHZRXOGKHOSFODULI\WKLVEXWP\YLHZLVWKDWWKHVXJJHVWLRQIRUDµ%,3
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURWRFRO¶FRXOGIRUPSDUWRIDQHZVHWRI$GPLQLVWUDWLYH,QVWUXFWLRQV
rather than needing a legislative base. 
 
 
 
Summary of recommendations 
 
5.1  ,QWURGXFHDµ%,3GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURWRFRO¶WRHVWDEOLVKDFOHDUDQG
auditable process for collecting and considering evidence and for making 
decisions. 
 
5.2 $GRSWWKHSULQFLSOHRIWKHµEDODQFHRISUREDELOLW\¶DVWKe standard of proof 
in social security decision making. 
 
5.3 Consider the feasibility and timing of a review of the stock of BIP awards 
based on the decision making protocol 
 
5.4 Consider the option of establishing a St Helena employment record that 
could form the basis of BIP decision making in the future. 
 
5.5 $PHQGWKH6RFLDO6HFXULW\2UGLQDQFHWRLQFOXGHDVHFWLRQRQµGHSULYDWLRQ
RIUHVRXUFHV¶ 
 
5.6 Mount education and publicity campaign to explain why changes are 
justified. 
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6. The wider social policy framework: Unemployment 
Allowance, Disability Allowance, Carers Allowance, 
Occupational Therapy payments 
6.1 Introduction  
The main focus of this Social Welfare Review has been on the major changes to the 
social security system brought in in April 2011: the introduction of Basic Island 
Pension and the reform of Income Related Benefit.  
 
However, there are a number of other social welfare payments that were left 
unchanged in 2011 but which form part of the wider welfare system. These are: 
x Unemployment allowance  
x Disability allowance  
x Carers allowance  
x Occupational therapy payments. 
 
All of these benefits are based on policy documents rather than being formalised in 
legislation. In this section we review some of the issues raised by stakeholders in the 
course of the Review and make suggestions for change. 
6.2 Unemployment Allowance  
Unemployment Allowance has no basis in legislation. The rules of entitlement and 
levels of award are matters of SHG policy.7 The Unemployment Allowance is for 
residents of St Helena aged between 16 and 64 who are actively seeking 
employment and have been out of employment for over six weeks. It is also available 
for those in employment but earning under £27.50 per week. Cases are reviewed 
every six weeks to ensure that the claimant is complying with the requirement to be 
actively seeing work. The current rate of payment is £15.08 a week for a single 
claimant. Because this rate is low, many recipients of Unemployment Allowance also 
make claims for Income Related Benefit. In February 2013 there were 21 recipients.8 
 
In our view Unemployment Allowance is an anomaly with the St Helena Social 
Security system. It could be abolished such that in future there would be a single 
benefit, IRB, that could be claimed by all working age claimants who are out of the 
labour market for whatever reason. This would simplify the current system and 
remove a layer of administration. To maintain a separate benefit for so few claimants 
does not seem justified. 
 
The main difference between Unemployment Allowance and IRB is that recipients of 
the former are required to actively seek work. There is a clear policy aim to make 
receipt of Unemployment Allowance conditional upon taking steps back to work. This 
                                            
7
 We were supplied with a copy of the current Unemployment Allowance policy document. It is nearly 
two pages long only and has no accompanying Administrative Instructions comparable to those drawn 
up for BIP and IRB. 
8
 A later figure supplied by the Claims Office on 2 April 2013 put the number of claimants at 13.  
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policy intent could be introduced into IRB using the mechanism of a different levels 
RIFRQGLWLRQDOLW\¶ 
 
Such a mechanism has been a feature of the UK system for a number of years. The 
principle is that each claimant is assessed as being in one of three categories of job 
readiness, each category having separate conditions attached.9 The table below 
illustrates how this might be done, recognising that the categories and conditions can 
be fine-tuned. 
 
Table 6.1 Possible conditionality regime for reformed IRB  
 
Category of job readiness Conditions 
Job ready. No significant barriers to work. 
Capable of taking a job immediately 
Must actively seek work 
Not job ready immediately. Some barriers to 
work (such as health problems) that need 
addressing before becoming 100% job ready 
Must be undertaking appropriate activity 
in order to become job ready 
Permanently unable to work No conditions attached 
 
The categorisation of a claimant would be the responsibility of the Claims Office 
staff. An individual Action Plan would then be drawn up so that there is a transparent 
EHQFKPDUNDJDLQVWZKLFKDFODLPDQW¶VHIIRUWVFDQEHDVVHVVHG)DLOXUHWRFRPSO\
with the Action Plan requirements would result in the imposition of a sanction. 
Sanctions already exist in the St Helena social security system but these should be 
reviewed separately. Sanctions need to meet a number of requirements. They 
should act as a warning and disincentive to future claimants, but should also effect 
changes in behaviour in the person receiving the sanction.  
 
A conditionality regime would apply to all IRB claimants. The policy aim would not be 
to impose punitive requirements on claimants but, on the contrary, be a mechanism 
that generates a dialogue and relationship between claimants and Claims Office staff 
oriented towards helping people find work. The role of the staff would change from 
predominantly processing claims and policing the system to one of active support 
and engagement with claimants.  
 
A further drawback in having Unemployment Allowance defined only in policy 
documents is that claimants have no formal rights of appeal comparable to claimants 
of BIP and IRB whose rights are clearly defined in the Social Security Ordinance. 
 
Amalgamating Unemployment Allowance and IRB is a logical development now that 
the two principal benefits of the social security system are defined in legislation. It is 
not necessarily a pressing reform but one that could be built in to medium term 
plans. It would require amendments to the Social Security Ordinance. 
                                            
9
 Changes to these arrangements will be made when Universal Credit is introduced in the UK in 
Autumn 2013. 
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6.3 Disability allowance, carers allowance and occupational therapy 
payment  
6.3.1 Disability Allowance  
Disability Allowance was introduced in the 1980s as a policy of SHG. It has no basis 
in legislation. Also it is not formally part of the social security system but a payment 
made from the budget of the Health and Social Welfare Directorate. 
 
$SHUVRQLVHQWLWOHGWRD'LVDELOLW\$OORZDQFHLIWKH\KDYHDµSHUPDQHQWSK\VLFDORU
mental impairment that has a substantial and long term adverse effect on his or her 
ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities as defined by the Senior Medical 
2IILFHU¶,WLVQRWDYDLODEOHWRSHRSOHZKRDUHDVVHVVHGDVKDYLQJDWHPSRUDU\
disability or who are living in full time residential care. It can be claimed by people in 
work as long as income from work does not exceed £30.52. People who are 
participating in the Occupational Therapy Scheme are exempt from this earnings 
limitation. 
 
At the time of the Review visit in February 2013 there were 99 Disability Allowances 
in payment.10 The value of an award was £9.45 a week. 
 
We received some representations that the allowance was confusing, and 
administered inconsistently. It was unclear to many what the purpose of the Disability 
Allowance was, and what it was meant to achieve. The level of the award was 
considered very low and had not been uprated for a number of years. There were 
also concerns that the strict test of permanent disability excluded a number of people 
who had a long term condition but might hope to recover (for example after medical 
treatment).  
 
Members of civil society organisations who worked with disabled people said that 
there was inconsistency in the decisions of the medical practitioners who had 
Disability Allowance claimants referred to them for assessment. They reported that 
people with very similar levels of disability sometimes attracted opposite 
assessments. 
 
It was not possible with the constraints of the Review to investigate Disability 
Allowance more fully but there is a strong case for a separate review that considers 
some fundamental policy questions, including what is the allowance for? What is it 
trying to achieve? What is the appropriate level of benefit needed to achieve its 
aims? How should eligibility be assessed? Who is best placed to make assessments 
of disability? How can consistency in decision making be achieved? 
 
An additional reason why such a review is important is that receipt of Disability 
Allowance is used in decision making on Basic Island Pension. Years in receipt of 
'LVDELOLW\$OORZDQFHFXUUHQWO\FRXQWWRZDUGVWKHµTXDOLI\LQJ \HDUV¶WKDWDUHXVHGWR
GHWHUPLQHDSHUVRQ¶VHOLJLELOLW\DQGOHYHORISHQVLRQ7KHUHLVDFRQFHUQWKDWWKH
current policy on Disability Allowance does not necessarily identify all those people 
who are prevented from entering the labour market because of long term health and 
                                            
10
 Figures supplied by the Claims Office on 2 April 2013 show that this figure had fallen to 94. 
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disabling conditions. Some people who cannot work temporarily get no recognition of 
that fact in the assessment of BIP. 
 
The recommendation that can be made at this stage is that a review of Disability 
Allowance is carried out and that the outcome of that review should be draft 
legislation rather than a new policy.  
 
6.3.2 ǯ 
/LNH8QHPSOR\PHQW$OORZDQFHDQG'LVDELOLW\$OORZDQFHHQWLWOHPHQWWR&DUHU¶V
Allowance is defined in SHG policy rather than legislation. To be accurate the 
DSSURSULDWHSROLF\GRFXPHQWGRHVQRWXVHWKHWHUPµ&DUHU
V$OORZDQFH¶EXWUHIHUVWR
a payment that can be made to people who provide care for people who are 
DVVHVVHGDVEHLQJLQWKHµ&ULWLFDO6XSSRUW&DWHJRU\¶XQGHUWKH+RPH6XSSRUW3ROLF\
of the Public Health and Social Services Department.  
 
Like Disability Allowance, Carer's Allowance is not formally part of the St Helena 
social security system. In February 2013 there were 17 people receiving a Carer's 
Allowance.  
 
$QHOLJLEOHµKRPHVXSSRUWZRUNHU¶UHFHLYHVDSD\PHQWRIDZHHNXQOHVVWKH\DUH
a family member (parent, spouse or civil partner) in which case the payment is 
reduced to £26.50 a week. The rationale for this reduction is that family members are 
expected as part of familial obligations WRµDWWHQGWRGRPHVWLFFKRUHV¶VXFKDV
cleaning and cooking. There is an exception for working age family members who 
give up paid employment to provide care. They are entitled to the full amount of £41. 
 
There were no particular critical comments about Carer's Allowance compared with 
Disability Allowance and whether there is any need to alter the basis on which it is 
paid is unclear. Carer's Allowance can be seen as a wage and therefore not part of 
the benefits system. On the other hand it could be seen as an income replacement 
benefit for people prevented from participating in the open labour market by their 
caring responsibilities. This latter scenario is certainly appropriate for people who do 
give up work to care for family members. 
 
It was not possible within the constraints of this Review to investigate Carer's 
Allowance in any depth and during the visit of Roy Sainsbury people in receipt of 
Carer's Allowance were not identified as a group to interview.  
 
It is recommended though as a medium to long term project that a separate review 
of Carer's Allowance is undertaken. 
 
6.3.3 Occupational Therapy Payments  
2FFXSDWLRQDOWKHUDS\SD\PHQWVDUHPDGHWRSHRSOHZRUNLQJLQ6+$3(6W+HOHQD¶V
Active Participation in Enterprise). SHAPE is a Social Enterprise established in 2008 
to offer training, support and employment opportunities to disabled and vulnerable 
adults. The current value of the payment is £30.52 a week.  
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OT payments are not formally part of the social security system and are not 
administered through the Claims Office or the social security payments system. 
Nevertheless they were discussed by stakeholders as a form of income that served 
as an alternative to income from the mainstream labour market.  
 
Occupational therapy payments did not form part of the terms of reference for this 
Review and we have no recommendations or suggestions for change at this stage. 
However should there be a review of Disability Allowance carried out as 
recommended above then the relationship between the two payments should be 
included in that Review. 
6.4  Conclusion  
This section has reviewed as far as possible within the constraints of the Review 
some elements of the wider social welfare system some of which extend beyond 
social security.  
 
The main conclusion is that after the major changes introduced in 2011 there is now 
a need to consolidate the social security and define as much as possible in 
legislation  rather than in policy documents. 
 
As mentioned above we recommend a separate review of Unemployment 
Allowance, Disability Allowance, Carer's Allowance and Occupational Therapy 
Payments. However, we do think that there is a case already for merging 
Unemployment Allowance with IRB, and for creating a legislative basis for Disability 
Allowance.  
 
 
 
Summary of recommendations 
 
6.1 Merge Unemployment Allowance and Income Related Benefit. 
 
6.2 Introduce a new conditionality regime for IRB that replicates to 
requirements on current Unemployment Allowance recipients.   
 
6.3 Set up a review of Disability Allowance, Carer's Allowance and 
Occupational Therapy Payments with the long term aim of including them 
in social security legislation rather than maintain them as instruments of 
policy. 
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7.  Operational issues Ȃ computerisation; the role of the Claims 
Office; appeals 
7.1 Introduction  
In the course of the Review a number of operational issues arose that were not 
anticipated from the terms of reference. These include the computerisation of the 
social security, the role of the staff of the Claims Office and the utilisation of the 
appeals process. These are all worth serious consideration as they afford 
opportunities for improving the performance and delivery of the social security 
system that should produce benefits for social security claimants and for SHG.   
7.2 Computerisation  
The current processes for deciding claims, calculating awards and recording 
information on claims are essentially manual and largely paper-based.  They are 
labour intensive and time consuming, and not designed for the easy analysis of the 
social security data. One striking example of the effects of a non-computerised 
system is the time that was taken to revise around 900 BIP and IRB claims in 
payment after the announcement of the uprating of benefits in October 2012. Every 
claim had to be manually revised and the process was not complete until the end of 
January 2013.  
 
It was also striking that even some seemingly basic questions that were raised by 
the Review Team proved impossible to answer quickly and easily. For example it 
was not straightforward to provide analyses of basic characteristics of the BIP and 
IRB populations.11 
 
There is a compelling case for full computerisation of the benefit system. This means 
developing a computer system that takes data input from the Claims Office staff and 
makes benefit calculations automatically.  
 
The advantages of computerisation would be as follows: 
x Shorter processing times 
x Reduction in possible errors in calculation 
x Uprating would become a quick and easy process taking days not months 
x Routine production of management data that can be used to analyse trends in 
benefit receipt and to produce performance data 
x Greater understanding of benefit dynamics 
x Information for policy making, especially if linked to other government data 
sources such as tax records. 
 
At present the only benefits administered by the Claims Office are Basic Island 
Pension, Income Related Benefit and Unemployment Allowance. A programme of 
                                            
11
 To carry out some basic analyses a special statistical exercise was undertaken on behalf of the 
Review Team by staff of the Statistics Office and the Claims Office.  
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computerisation should therefore commence with these. However in time it is 
recommended that other benefits, such as Disability Allowance and Carer's 
Allowance are integrated into the computerised system. 
 
There is also an issue of timing. This Social Welfare Review is recommending 
changes to the rules of BIP and IRB, and the abolition of Unemployment Allowance. 
It would make sense to start computerisation only after any structural changes are 
made. Having said that, preliminary work on computerisation, such as the basic 
architecture, should be possible in the meantime. 
 
At present the St Helena social security system is relatively uncomplicated (certainly 
compared with the UK and other developed countries) and this is one of its strengths 
and virtues. It should therefore not be a major technical challenge to design a 
bespoke computerised system for the Island.   
7.3 The role of the Claims Office 
The Claims Office has only two staff. The Manager combines a management role 
with the roles of front line claims processer and fraud officer. The Claims Officer 
deals exclusively with the administration of benefits. The Claims Office comes under 
the managerial oversight and direction of the Director of Health and Social Welfare. 
 
Between them the two Claims Office staff maintain over 800 claims for BIP, IRB and 
Unemployment Allowance. As noted above this is largely manual work and is labour 
intensive and time consuming. The last report from the Audit Department dealt in 
detail with the administration of the social security system and made a number of 
recommendations for improvement. It was not the intention of this Review therefore 
to replicate this work. 
 
From our consultations with the staff themselves and others in SHG plus first hand 
observations of the work carried out we can make a number of observations 
intended to contribute to future developments. 
 
7.3.1 Volume of workload 
The volume of work for the Office appears considerable, particularly during the 
periods of uprating. The nature of the work, as mentioned above, is predominantly 
benefit processing with some monitoring of Unemployment Allowance claimants, and 
for the Manager, some additional fraud work.  
 
One of the outcomes from the computerisation of the system should be that the 
processing of new claims and the maintenance of existing claims will become 
quicker and easier. There should be more time therefore to devote to maintaining a 
relationship with claimants to ensure that they are receiving all their due entitlements 
and complying with the conditionality requirements. This latter task will certainly 
become more prominent if the recommendation in this Report to merge 
Unemployment Allowance with IRB is put into practice. 
 
There is an opportunity at this time to reconfigure the role of the Claims Office to 
become more active in this way, including offering help and advice to people 
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currently out of the labour market to start or return to work. Such a role would go 
towards meeting one of the social objectives of the 2013-2018 Social Policy Plan: 
³HPSOR\PHQWIRUDOOWKRVHZKRQHHGDQGDUHDEOHWRZork with support for those who 
need additional help to enable them tRILQGZRUN´ 
 
7.3.2 The isolation and vulnerability of Claims Office staff 
Because the population of St Helena is small and maintaining any sort of anonymity 
in work is virtually impossible the two staff of the Claims Office are in a potentially 
vulnerable position. 
 
The staff are acting as independent adjudication officers on behalf of SHG. Although 
they may be required to make a number of judgments in the course of their work, the 
Ordinance and Regulations do not grant them any formal discretion to make 
payments. This is a situation that is seen as desirable by the stakeholders consulted 
during the Review including members of the Legislative Council. It is inevitable 
however that some people are unhappy with the outcome of their claim. At present 
there are two common responses from claimants. They either make direct 
representations to the Claims staff by visiting the office or phoning, or direct a 
complaint via their elected Councillor who then makes representations on their 
behalf. 
 
This form of direct engagement with adjudication staff would be considered 
inappropriate in most other countries. It exposes them to direct pressure which in a 
small community can be particularly difficult to deal with. It is appropriate however for 
any claimant or their representative to request an explanation of a decision or ask for 
more information about a claim. But if any challenge to the decision is intended, 
either immediately or after further information has been supplied, this should be 
made using the current procedures established by the Social Security Ordinance 
2010. How this should work is discussed further in section 7.4 below. 
 
7.3.3 Incomplete Administrative Instructions 
The Social Security Ordinance and Regulations set out the legislative framework of 
BIP and IRB but these are not appropriate or adequate working documents for 
directing Claims staff in how to administer claims. Recognising this, the former Social 
:HOIDUH&RQVXOWDQWKDGEHJXQWRGUDZXSWZRVHWVRIµ$GPLQLVWUDWLYHInstructions¶but 
does not appear to have completed the task. They are still in draft form.  
 
These are important documents that need to be revised and completed and kept up 
to date as changes to the system are made in the future. In the absence of a 
Consultant to do this work it is suggested that the Health and Social Welfare 
Directorate is the most appropriate part of SHG to take responsibility for the task 
drawing on the day-to-day experience of the Claims Office staff, SPPU staff, and 
staff in the Audit and Law Departments.  
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7.4 Appeals 
In the course of this Review we received representations about the lack of an 
effective and fair appeals process. However, after investigating this further we have 
come to the view that an adequate process already exists and that therefore any 
problems arise from a lack of knowledge about what has been provided. What is also 
lacking is a set of Administrative Instructions that can guide the Claims staff when 
they receive any follow up contact about individual claims after decisions have been 
made. 
 
The appeals process, which also covers reviews of decisions, is clearly set out in 
section 14 of the Social Security Ordinance 2010. It is replicated in the box for clarity.  
 
 
Review and appeal  
 
14.  (1)  Any person who is aggrieved by a decision of the adjudication officer -  
(a)  to refuse an application for payment of any benefit;  
(b)  with respect to the rate or amount of entitlement to such benefit; or  
(c) to withdraw, adjust or suspend the payment of such benefit, may, 
within 14 days of being infoUPHGRIWKHDGMXGLFDWLRQRIILFHU¶VGHFLVLRQ
request that such decision be reviewed by the Head of the 
Department of the St. Helena Public Service in which such 
adjudication officer is employed.  
(2)  A person who is aggrieved by the decision of the Head of Department 
under subsection (1) may, within 14 days of being informed of that decision, 
DSSHDOWRWKH0DJLVWUDWHV¶&RXUWDJDLQVWVXFKGHFLVLRQ 
 
 
 
There is no single source of information for claimants and representatives about 
what to do when they are not happy about a decision on their claim. Publicity leaflets 
on BIP and IRB produced by the Health and Social Welfare Directorate contain the 
same short paragraph on appeals and the separate leaflet on overpayments has 
more detailed information about how the review and appeals processes work. As 
mentioned earlier in the report, there are no formal rights for claimants of 
Unemployment Allowance. 
 
In conclusion St Helena has perfectly adequate procedures for dealing with reviews 
and appeals on BIP and IRB claims. These need to be publicised more widely 
among all stakeholders. A dedicated leaflet would be useful. A clear set of 
Administrative Instructions is needed setting out the roles of the Claims staff and the 
Director of Health and Social Welfare (as the FXUUHQWµ+HDGRI'HSDUWPHQW¶DV
defined in the Ordinance). The Claims staff should feel confident in passing 
appropriate cases to the Director. 
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7.5 Conclusion  
This section has considered three different operational issues: computerisation of the 
social security system, the role of the Claims Office and use of the Appeals system. 
Following the reform of IRB and the introduction of BIP there has been a period of 
settling in and adjustment to the new arrangements among the claimants and the 
staff of the Claims Office. Now that the staff have settled in to a familiar and 
streamlined pattern of working it has become clear that that are now opportunities for 
change and development. The computerisation of the system must be a firm priority. 
This will release staff time to develop their roles away from mainly processing 
benefits and more towards becoming active advisers and helpers to people who are 
currently out of work. 
 
 
 
Summary of recommendations 
 
7.1 Commence as soon as possible the computerisation of the social security 
system. 
 
7.2 As a consequence of computerisation redefine the role of the Claims 
Office staff so that more support can be offered to people out of work to 
enter or return to the labour market. 
 
7.3 Ensure that the complaints and appeals procedures are more widely 
understood and properly implemented so that Claims Office staff are not 
inappropriately approached by claimants and their representatives. 
 
7.4 Provide Claims Office staff with comprehensive and up to date 
Administrative Instructions (completing the work commenced by the former 
Social Policy Planner). 
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8. Conclusion and summary of recommendations 
The conclusions from this Social Welfare Review are divided into recommendations 
for policy decisions that we make with some confidence and suggestions for further 
work on some issues before policy decisions are taken. Our conclusions are based 
on the recognition that all policy decisions are ultimately political decisions that must 
be taken in the context of a variety of influences and constraints, not least the limited 
resources that are available on St Helena to make changes.  
 
Also in making these recommendations we are aware that not everything can be 
achieved at once or indeed soon and that hard decisions need to be taken about the 
level of resources that can be made available to fund any desired changes. In 
considering these recommendations therefore we hope that none are rejected as 
impossible purely on cost grounds. A sensible outcome from this review process 
would be a plan of action that takes in the next five years. This is the approach taken 
in the 2013-2018 St Helena Social Policy Plan and we recommend it as appropriate 
to making changes to the social welfare system. 
Summary of recommendations  
 
Adequacy and uprating 
 
2.1 Continue the development work on a minimum income standard for St 
Helena and as soon as practicable adopt a minimum income standards 
approach as the basis for setting and uprating benefit levels. 
 
2.2 SHG to work towards the introduction of a child benefit/allowance as soon 
as possible. 
 
 
 
 
Targeting of benefits: Definition of household 
 
3.1 Change the basis of IRB awards from household to families (defined as 
claimant, partner and children). 
 
3.2 Draft changes to the Social Security Ordinance to effect this change. 
 
3.3 8QGHUWDNHIXUWKHUZRUNRQDSRVVLEOHµVKDUHGKRXVHKROGGHGXFWLRQ¶WRWDNH
into account the economies of scale of people living together and sharing 
household costs. 
 
3.4 Undertake further work on options whether or not to increase the income of 
TP recipients in recognition of rising prices.  
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Targeting of benefits: Basic Island Pension qualifying criteria 
 
4.1 Extend BIP entitlement to people who have worked fewer than 20 years on 
St Helena. 
 
4.2 &RXQWZRUNRIILVODQGDVFRQWULEXWLQJWR%,3µTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶ 
 
4.3 &RXQWZRUNDIWHUWKHDJHRIWRZDUGVµTXDOLI\LQJ\HDUV¶ 
 
4.4 Remove the rule imposing loss of entitlement for claimants off island for 
over 90 days.  
 
4.5 Allow a greater range of evidence of working, caring or being disabled. 
 
4.6 Give further consideration to:  
x Increasing the incomes of retired 60-65 year olds. 
x Abolishing reductions in BIP award for claimants receiving a pension 
from another source. 
 
 
 
 
BIP and IRB: evidence issues 
 
5.1  ,QWURGXFHDµ%,3GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURWRFRO¶WRHVWDEOLVKDFOHDUDQGDXGLWDEOH
process for collecting and considering evidence and for making decisions. 
 
5.2 $GRSWWKHSULQFLSOHRIWKHµEDODQFHRISUREDELOLW\¶DVWKHVWDQGDUGRISURRILQ
social security decision making. 
 
5.3 Consider the feasibility and timing of a review of the stock of BIP awards 
based on the decision making protocol 
 
5.4 Consider the option of establishing a St Helena employment record that 
could form the basis of BIP decision making in the future. 
 
5.5 $PHQGWKH6RFLDO6HFXULW\2UGLQDQFHWRLQFOXGHDVHFWLRQRQµGHSULYDWLRQRI
UHVRXUFHV¶ 
 
5.6 Mount an education and publicity campaign to explain why changes are 
justified. 
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Unemployment Allowance, Disability Allowance, Carers Allowance, 
Occupational Therapy payments 
 
6.1 Merge Unemployment Allowance and Income Related Benefit. 
 
6.2 Introduce a new conditionality regime for IRB that replicates and extends the 
requirements on current Unemployment Allowance recipients.   
 
6.3 Set up a review of Disability Allowance, Carer's Allowance and Occupational 
Therapy Payments with the long term aim of including them in social 
security legislation rather than maintain them as instruments of policy. 
 
 
 
 
Operational issues 
 
7.1 Commence as soon as possible the computerisation of the social security 
system. 
 
7.2 As a consequence of computerisation redefine the role of the Claims Office 
staff so that more support can be offered to people out of work to enter or 
return to the labour market. 
 
7.3 Ensure that the complaints and appeals procedures are more widely 
understood and properly implemented so that Claims Office staff are not 
inappropriately approached by claimants and their representatives. 
 
7.4 Provide Claims Office staff with comprehensive and up to date 
Administrative Instructions (completing the work commenced by the former 
Social Policy Planner). 
 
 
 
